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Finite-key analysis for twin-field quantum key distribution with composable security
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Long-distance quantum key distribution (QKD) has long time seriously relied on trusted relay
or quantum repeater, which either has security threat or is far from practical implementation.
Recently, a solution called twin-field (TF) QKD and its variants have been proposed to overcome
this challenge. However, most security proofs are complicated, a majority of which could only
ensure security against collective attacks. Until now, the full and simple security proof can only be
provided with asymptotic resource assumption. Here, we provide a composable finite-key analysis for
coherent-state-based TF-QKD with rigorous security proof against general attacks. Furthermore, we
develop the optimal statistical fluctuation analysis method to significantly improve secret key rate
in high-loss regime. The results show that coherent-state-based TF-QKD is practical and feasible,
with the potential to apply over nearly one thousand kilometers.
INTRODUCTION
Classical encryption communication plays a central
role in network security, which, however, faces increas-
ingly serious security threats with quantum computa-
tion [1]. Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2, 3] promises
information-theoretically secure encryption communica-
tion with the laws of quantum mechanics. However, in
practice, there are two important problems severely re-
strict QKD implementations. One is the rate-distance
limit of QKD [4], which means that the secret key rate is
linear scaling with channel transmittance and bounded
by the secret-key capacity of quantum channel [4, 5]. It
is believed that the limit of transmission distance is ap-
proximately 500 km ultralow-loss fibre [6]. The other is
the quantum hacking attacks or, more precisely, the side-
channel attacks on detection [7]. In the security proof of
typical QKD, one requires that the detection probabil-
ity of signal is basis-independent. However, it is very
easy to be broken without being detected, for example,
by the detector blinding attack [8]. The big gap between
experimental realizations and theoretical models on the
measurement devices is often exploited by eavesdroppers
to successfully steal the key.
To circumvent the rate-distance limit, the trusted re-
lay [9] or quantum repeater [10] schemes are proposed.
However, the trusted relay significantly compromise the
security while the quantum repeater techniques are far
from practical implementation. To overcome the side-
channel attacks on detection, the measurement-device-
independent (MDI) QKD based on two-photon Bell state
measurement [11] has been proposed and experimentally
demonstrated over 404 km ultralow-loss fibre [12]. Un-
fortunately, the secret key rate of MDI-QKD is far below
typical QKD in realistic implementations [12, 13].
Recently, a novel protocol known as twin-field (TF)
QKD [14] has been introduced to simultaneously solve
the above two problems by exploiting the single-photon
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interference in the untrusted relay, which provides a se-
cret key rate proportional to the square-root of chan-
nel transmittance and is immune to any attack on mea-
surement devices. Until now, several proof-of-principle
experimental demonstration of TF-QKD have already
been successfully performed [15–18], indicating that the
techniques of TF-QKD are realizable. The original TF-
QKD is a remarkable breakthrough in the field of quan-
tum communication even without unconditional security
proof. To prove the security of TF-QKD, two types of
variants are proposed [19–28]. One is the single-photon-
based TF-QKD [21, 22, 24] first proposed in Ref. [21]
named as sending-or-not-sending protocol with a security
proof against coherent attack. It is similar with the orig-
inal TF-QKD using the single-photon component to ex-
tract secret key by implementing single-photon Bell state
measurement [22, 24]. Recently, we became aware that
the single-photon based protocol and its key rate formula,
Eq. (3) presented in Ref. [22] are actually same with the
earlier protocol [21], sending-or-not-sending protocol pro-
posed by Wang et al. We thank authors of Ref. [21] for
pointing out this. The other is the coherent-state-based
TF-QKD [19, 20, 24–28], or called phase-matching QKD,
which directly exploits the coherent state to extract se-
cret key by implementing entangled coherent state mea-
surement [28]. However, so far, taking into account all
finite-size effects in TF-QKD with rigorously composable
security proof is still missing, which severely influences
TF-QKD to become as practical and feasible as typical
QKD [29, 30] and MDI-QKD [31] with composable secu-
rity under realistic conditions.
In this work, we provide a composable finite-key analy-
sis for coherent-state-based TF-QKD with rigorous secu-
rity proof against general attacks. We make three contri-
butions to obtain the optimal secret key rate and show
that the transmission distance can surpass 800 km fi-
bre with the realistic technology. First, we use the en-
tropic uncertainty relation [32] to prove the security of
coherent-state-based TF-QKD in the finite-key regime.
It is known to all that entropic uncertainty relation is
well suited for the composable security proof against gen-
eral attacks, which is rather direct and avoids various
2FIG. 1. The setup of coherent-state-based TF-QKD. For Pro-
tocol 1 (2), Alice and Bob prepare coherent states |±α〉 if
choosing Z basis and cat states |ξ±(α)〉 (PRCS) if choosing
X basis. They send the prepared quantum signals through
insecure channel to the untrusted Charlie, who is supposed
to perform an entangled coherent state measurement. As an
example, Charlie let the two received optical pulses interfere
at a symmetric beam splitter (BS), which has on each end a
threshold single-photon detector. A click in the single-photon
detector L implies a projection into the entangled coherent
state |Φ−〉 = 1/√N−(|α〉 |α〉 − |−α〉 |−α〉), while a click in
single-photon detector R indicates a projection into the en-
tangled coherent state |Ψ−〉 = 1/√N−(|α〉 |−α〉 − |−α〉 |α〉).
Details can be found in main text.
estimations [29–31]. Second, we develop the tight and
rigorous multiplicative Chernoff bound and its variant
to deal with the difference between the observed value
and the expected value, which closes the gap between
the large-deviation Chernoff bound method [31] and the
not-sufficiently-rigorous Gaussian analysis. Third, the
tailored tail inequality for random sampling without re-
placement is the tightest, which further improves the se-
cret key rate in the finite-key regime.
RESULTS
Security definition. Before introducing our protocol,
we follow the discussion of the so-called universally com-
posable framework [33]. A general QKD protocol either
outcomes a pair of key bit strings S and Sˆ for Alice and
Bob or aborts denoted by S = Sˆ =⊥. The length of bit
strings S and Sˆ are both equal to ℓ. In general, the QKD
protocol is called secure if the key bit strings satisfy two
criteria, namely, the correctness and the secrecy criteria.
The correctness criterion is met if the key bit strings
of Alice and Bob are identical, i.e., S = Sˆ. However, the
correctness criterion cannot be perfectly satisfied in ex-
periment, which means that we may allow some negligible
errors. Specifically, we say that a protocol is εcor-correct
if Pr[S 6= Sˆ] ≤ εcor, i.e., the probability that Alice’s and
Bob’s key bit strings are not identical does not exceed
εcor.
Let system E be the information of eavesdropper dur-
ing the process of the QKD protocol, {|s〉}s be an or-
thonormal basis for Alice’s system and ρs
E
be the state
of the system E given any fixed value s of key bit string
S. In order to define secrecy, we should introduce a de-
scription of the correlation between the key bit string
of Alice S and eavesdropper, which can be given by the
joint classical-quantum state ρSE =
∑
s ps |s〉 〈s| ⊗ ρsE.
The secrecy criterion is met if the system E completely
has no correlation with the key bit string of Alice, i,e.,
ρSE = US ⊗ ρE, where US =
∑
s
1
|S| |s〉 〈s| is the uniform
mixture of all possible values of the key bit string S. How-
ever, the secrecy criterion can still never be perfectly sat-
isfied in experiment. We say that a protocol is εsec-secret
if the trace distance between the joint classical-quantum
state ρSE and the ideal case described by US ⊗ ρE is no
more than ∆, i.e.,
1
2
‖ρSE − US ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ∆,
and (1 − pabout)∆ ≤ εsec, where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm
and pabort is the probability that the protocol aborts.
Therefore, we say that a protocol is ε-secure if it is εcor-
correct and εsec-secret with εcor + εsec ≤ ε.
Measurement results of Charlie
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
Alice & Bob |Φ−〉 |Ψ−〉 |Φ−〉 |Ψ−〉
Z basis No flip Flip No flip Flip
X basis Flip Flip — —
TABLE I. Post-processing of raw key in the sifting step. Bob
will decide whether he implements a key bit flip to guarantee
correct correlations, depending on the announced entangled
coherent state and the selected basis. Note that there is no
key bit in the X basis for Protocol 2.
Protocol definition. Here, we follow two protocols pro-
posed in our very recent work [28]. One prepares cat
state to bound the leaked information, called Protocol 1.
The other exploits the phase-randomized coherent state
(PRCS) to estimate the leaked information, called Pro-
tocol 2. For simplicity, we only consider the case of sym-
metric channel, while the case of the asymmetric chan-
nel can be directly generalized [28]. The schematic di-
agram of two protocols are illustrated in Fig. 1. Alice
randomly chooses Z and X bases with probabilities pZ
and 1 − pZ, respectively. Alice randomly prepares op-
tical pulses with coherent states |α〉 and |−α〉 in equal
probabilities for the logic bits 0 and 1 if choosing the Z
basis. For Protocol 1 (2), Alice randomly generates op-
tical pulses with cat states |ξ+(α)〉 = (|α〉 + |−α〉)/√2
and |ξ−(α)〉 = (|α〉 − |−α〉)/√2 in equal probabilities
for the logic bits 0 and 1 (PRCS) if choosing the X ba-
sis. Likewise, Bob does the same. The optical pulses are
sent to the untrusted Charlie, who is assumed to perform
the entangled coherent state measurement that projects
them into an entangled coherent state. The decoy-state
method [34–36] will be used in Protocol 2 to estimate the
leaked information.
Next, Charlie will disclose whether he has acquired
a successful measurement result and which entangled
coherent state is obtained. Alice and Bob only keep
3the data of successful measurement and discard the
rest. They announce the basis and intensity information
through the authenticated classical channel and only keep
the events of the same basis. Finally, Bob flips a part of
his key bit to correctly correlate with Alice’s (see Ta-
ble I). A detailed description of each step of Protocols 1
and 2 as follows.
1. State Preparation: The first four steps are re-
peated by Alice and Bob for i = 1, . . . , N until
the conditions in the Sifting step are satisfied. In
Protocol 1, Alice chooses a basis β ∈ {Z,X} and
uniformly random bit r ∈ {0, 1} with probability
pβ/2. Next, Alice prepares optical pulses with co-
herent state |eirπα〉 (cat state (|α〉+eirπ |−α〉)/√2)
for Z (X) basis given by r. Likewise, Bob does the
same thing. In Protocol 2, Alice chooses a basis
β ∈ {Z,X} with probability pβ. Then, she chooses
uniformly random bit r ∈ {0, 1} with probability
1/2 given by the Z basis and an intensity with
probability pa given by the X basis. Next, Alice
prepares optical pulses with coherent state |eirπα〉
for the Z basis given by r. She generates PRCS
optical pulses of intensity a for X basis. Likewise,
Bob does the same thing.
2. Distribution: Alice and Bob send their optical
pulses to untrusted Charlie through the insecure
quantum channel.
3. Measurement: Charlie let the two optical pulses in-
terfere in the symmetric beam splitter and performs
the entangled state measurement. For each i, he
publicly informs Alice and Bob whether or not his
measurement is successful and which entangled co-
herent state is obtained.
4. Sifting: Alice and Bob announce their basis choices
and intensity settings over an authenticated classi-
cal channel when Charlie reports a successful event.
Bob flips part of his key bits to correctly correlate
with Alice’s (see Table I). In Protocol 1, we define
the set Z (X ), which identifies signals when Alice
and Bob select the same basis Z (X) and Charlie
has a successful measurement. The protocol re-
peats these steps until |Z| ≥ n and |X | ≥ k. In
Protocol 2, we define two groups of sets Z and Xa,b.
The first (second) one identifies signals where Alice
and Bob select the basis Z (X and the intensities a
and b) and Charlie has a successful measurement.
The protocol repeats these steps till |Z| ≥ n and
|Xa,b| ≥ ka,b ∀a, b.
5. Parameter Estimation: Alice and Bob exploit the
random bits from Z to form the raw key bit strings
Z and Z′, respectively. In Protocol 1 (2), Alice
and Bob use Z and X (Xa,b) to estimate the upper
bound of phase error rate φZ. If φZ > φtol, Al-
ice (Bob) assigns an empty string ⊥ to S (Sˆ) and
aborts this protocol.
6. Error Correction: Bob exploits an information rec-
onciliation scheme to acquire an estimate Zˆ of Z
by revealing at most leakEC bits of error correc-
tion data. Then, Alice computes a hash of length
⌈log2(1/ǫcor)⌉ by using a random universal2 hash
function [37] to Z. She sends the choice function
and the hash to Bob. Bob uses the received hash
function to compute the hash of Zˆ and compares
with Alice’s. If they are different, Alice (Bob) as-
signs an empty string to S (Sˆ) and aborts this pro-
tocol.
7. Privacy Amplification: Alice exploits a random
universal2 hash function [37] to extract length ℓ
bits of secret key S from Z. Bob uses the same
hash function (sent by Alice) to extract length ℓ
bits of secret key Sˆ from Zˆ.
Identifying any one of two entangled coherent states
|Φ−〉 = 1/√N−(|α〉 |α〉 − |−α〉 |−α〉) and |Ψ−〉 =
1/
√
N−(|α〉 |−α〉 − |−α〉 |α〉) can allow us to prove the
security [28], where N− = 2(1 − e−4µ) is the normal-
ization factor, and µ = |α|2 is the intensity of coherent
states |±α〉. Here, we consider that two entangled coher-
ent states both can be identified. Indeed, the coherent-
state-based TF-QKD is a prepare-and-measure protocol
reduced from the entanglement-based QKD using her-
alded entanglement generation protocol (see Methods).
Security analysis. Here, we show the main result of our
paper. One can make sure that Protocol 1 (2) introduced
above is both εcor-correct and εsec-secret if we choose an
appropriate secret key of length ℓ. The required correct-
ness criterion could be ensured by the error-verification
step. Alice and Bob compare the random hash values of
their corrected keys with failure probability εhash, which
means that identical probability of key bit strings S and
Sˆ is more than 1− εhash. Even if the protocol is aborted,
resulting in S = Sˆ =⊥, it is also correct. Thereby, the
correctness of the protocol is εcor = εhash.
For Protocol 1, the protocol is εsec-secret if the secret
key of length ℓ satisfies
ℓ ≤ n[1− h(φZ)]− leakEC − log2
2
εcor
− 2 log2
2
εsec
, (1)
where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the bi-
nary Shannon entropy function. Recall that n and φZ
are the number of bits and phase error rate in bit string
Z. A sketch of the proof of Eq. (17) can be found in
Methods. In the asymptotic limit, φZ = EX since sta-
tistical fluctuations could be neglected, and thus ℓ sat-
isfies ℓ ≤ n[1 − h(EX)] − leakEC, as recently acquired
in [28]. nh(φZ) is the amount of information acquired by
the eavesdropper in the quantum process, while leakEC is
the information revealed by Alice in the error correction
step.
4FIG. 2. Expected key rate as function of the distance. a (b), secret key rate ℓ/N in logarithmic scale for Protocol 1 (2) as a
function of the fibre distance. The colour lines correspond to different values for the total number of signals N sent by Alice
and Bob. In comparison, the black line represents the repeaterless PLOB bound. For simulation, we consider the following
parameters: the loss coefficient of the fibre channel is 0.16 dB/km, the detection efficiency and dark count rate are 85% and
10−11. The overall misalignment rate in the channel is set to 2%, and the security bound of secrecy is εsec = 10
−10. The results
show clearly that the secret key rates of coherent-state-based TF-QKD in Protocols 1 and 2 can break the repeaterless PLOB
bound even with a small finite size of data, say N = 108 for Protocol 1 and 1010 for Protocol 2. The maximum transmission
distance of Protocols 1 and 2 are more than 1000 km and 800 km with the realistic finite size of data N = 1013.
For Protocol 2, the protocol is εsec-secret if the secret
key of length ℓ satisfies (see Methods)
ℓ ≤ n[1− h(φZ)]− leakEC − log2
2
εcor
− 2 log2
31
2εsec
.
(2)
The other two main contributions of our work are the
rigorous and tight statistical fluctuation analysis meth-
ods. One is the tightest multiplicative Chernoff bound
and its variant to deal with the difference between the
observed value and the expected value. The other is the
tightest tail inequality for random sampling without re-
placement. In order to meet the composable security
proof against general attacks in the finite-key regime,
one can only assume the random variables are indepen-
dent but not identically distributed. Traditionally, a
large deviation theory with the Chernoff bound is pro-
posed to deal with the parameter estimation in MDI-
QKD with finite-key analysis [31], which is a rigorous
but not tight method, i.e., significant statistical fluctua-
tions quickly decrease the expected secret key rate in the
high-loss regime. Whereafter, another approach [38] is
proposed, attempting to close the gap between the rigor-
ous large-deviation Chernoff bound method [31] and the
not-sufficiently-rigorous Gaussian analysis (independent
and identically distributed). However, this approach of-
fers a tighter estimation of the lower bound (given the
small observed value) than the Gaussian analysis, which
seems to be a counterfactual result as the method [38]
is superior to the Gaussian analysis. Our rigorously im-
proved method are always inferior but comparable to the
Gaussian analysis. Furthermore, we give two tailored tail
inequalities (lower and upper tails) to deal with the ran-
dom sampling without replacement issue, which directly
utilizes hypergeometric function distribution and avoids
any inequality scaling [30, 39]. The rigorous proof and
detailed analysis can be found in Supplementary Notes
1, 2 and 3.
DISCUSSION
Here, we perform the behaviour of the expected secret
key rate provided in Eq. (17) of Protocol 1 and Eq. (18)
of Protocol 2. In our simulation, we use the following
parameters, a fibre-based channel with an ultralow-loss
of 0.16 dB/km [12]. The efficiency and dark count rate
of single-photon detector are 85% and 10−11 in the un-
trusted relay [13]. The security bounds of secrecy and
correctness are fixed to εsec = 10
−10 and εcor = 10−15,
the latter of which corresponds to a realistic hash tag
size in practice [37]. For simplicity, we assume an error
correction leakage that is a fixed fraction of the sifted key
length n, i.e., leakEC = nζh(EZ), with the efficiency of
error correction ζ = 1.1 and the quantum bit error rate
EZ of the Z basis.
The results are shown in Figs. 2 and 3 where Alice
and Bob exploit the three-intensity PRCS, one of which
is a vacuum state. The detailed computational process
of the phase error rate φZ can be found in Methods. The
expected secret key rate (per pulse) ℓ/N as a function
of the transmission distance between Alice and Bob for
different values of the total number of signals N sent
by Alice and Bob given by overall misalignment 2% in
the channel is shown in Fig 2. For a given transmis-
sion distance, we optimize numerically ℓ/N over all the
free parameters of Protocols 1 and 2. For the case of
symmetric channel, all parameters chosen by Alice and
Bob are set to the same. Our simulation result shows
clearly that coherent-state-based TF-QKD is the feasible
5FIG. 3. Expected key rate as function of the block size. a, Protocol 1. b, Protocol 2. The plot shows the secret key rate ℓ/N
in logarithmic scale as a function of the total number of signals N sent by Alice and Bob in the transmission distance of 500 km.
The security bound of secrecy εsec = 10
−10. The colour solid lines correspond to different values for the overall misalignment
rate. The colour dotted lines show the corresponding asymptotic rates [28]. In comparison, the black line represents the PLOB
bound given by the transmission distance of 500 km. The results show that the coherent-state-based TF-QKD is robust to the
large misalignment rate even for a finite size of signals sent by Alice and Bob.
scheme in the finite-key regime. Considering the case of 1
GHz repetition rate [15], the secret key rate of Protocols
1 and 2 can break the repeaterless Pirandola-Laurenza-
Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound [5] even with a small
finite size of data, say N = 108 (data collected in 0.1 s)
for Protocol 1 and 1010 (data collected in 10 s) for Pro-
tocol 2. Moreover, the maximum transmission distance
of Protocols 1 and 2 can be expanded up to 1000 km and
800 km with the realistic finite size of data N = 1013 (less
than 2.8 h data). The secret key rate in Protocols 1 and
2 given by 470 km are both larger than 10−6 per pulse
(1 kbps) under the finite size of data N = 1012. It means
that the coherent-state-based TF-QKD has the potential
to be actually used even when the communication dis-
tance is approximate to 500 km. This is impossible when
using the traditional QKD or MDI-QKD, where the best
results are 0.25 bps at 421 km of traditional QKD un-
der the collective attacks assumption [13] and 3.2× 10−4
bps at 404 km of MDI-QKD under the coherent attacks
assumption [12].
Figure 3 illustrates ℓ/N as a function of N for different
values of the misalignment in the transmission distance
of 500 km. For comparison, this figure also includes the
asymptotic secret key rate when Alice and Bob send an
infinite number of signals [28] and the repeaterless PLOB
bound. For a given number of signals, we optimize nu-
merically ℓ/N over all the free parameters of Protocols
1 and 2. The fixed parameters are the ones described in
the caption of Fig. 3. The simulation results show that
the secret key rates of Protocols 1 and 2 are about 10−7
at the distance of 500 km with 1011 and 5× 1013 signals,
even given that the misalignment rate is up to 15%. The
significant secret key rate of Protocols 1 and 2 at the dis-
tance of 500 km can be acquired only with 109 and 1011
signals when the misalignment rate is less than 5%.
In summary, we have proved the composable security
of coherent-state-based TF-QKD in the finite-key regime
against general attacks. The maximum transmission dis-
tance of Protocols 1 and 2 are more than 1000 km and
800 km with the realistic finite size of data, respectively.
The coherent-state-based TF-QKD is the fully practi-
cal QKD protocol that offers an avenue to bridge the
gap between trusted relay and quantum repeater in long-
distance QKD implementations. In order to be immune
to general attacks in the finite-key regime, the indepen-
dent and identically distributed assumption of Gaussian
analysis (the central-limit theorem) is no longer appli-
cable. We have rigorously proved an improved Cher-
noff bound and its variant, which can close the gap be-
tween the large-deviation Chernoff bound method and
the Gaussian analysis. Numerical simulations display
that our improved method is always inferior but com-
parable to the Gaussian analysis. The rigorous and tight
statistical fluctuation analysis methods of this work will
be widely applied to quantum cryptography protocols
with the finite-size effects, such as QKD, quantum dig-
ital signature, and quantum secret sharing. We remark
that cat state has a certain distance from the actual ap-
plication with current technique. Last but not least, the
homodyne measurement may be exploited to identify the
entangled coherent state in the coherent-state-based TF-
QKD, which is worth considering in the future.
METHODS
Entanglement-based protocol. In order to establish
the secrecy of the protocols, we introduce an equiva-
lently virtual entanglement-based protocol [28], in which
Alice and Bob prepare entangled states of a qubit and
an optical mode |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 |α〉+ |−z〉 |−α〉), where
6qubit states |±z〉 are the eigenstates of Pauli’s Z oper-
ator. They keep the qubit and send the optical mode
to the untrusted Charlie, who performs the entangled
coherent state measurement. The bipartite qubit entan-
glement states between Alice and Bob are thus generated
via entanglement swapping. Indeed, the coherent states
|±α〉 and the cat states |ξ±(α)〉 will be sent to Char-
lie if they perform the Z- and X-basis measurement on
the qubit system, respectively. Thereby, the coherent-
state-based TF-QKD is a prepare-and-measure protocol
reduced from the entanglement-based QKD using her-
alded entanglement generation protocol (we refer to the
article [28] for details).
Secrecy. Let us keep the entanglement-based QKD us-
ing heralded entanglement generation protocol in our
mind. We exploit the entropic uncertainty relations [29,
32] to estimate bounds on the smooth min-entropy of
the raw key conditioned on eavesdropper’s information.
The Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma [37] is exploited to
give a direct operational meaning to the smooth min-
entropy. Let E′ summarizes all information of eavesdrop-
per learned about raw key of Alice Z, up to the error-
correction step. By applying a random universal2 hash
function to Z, one may extract a ∆-secret key of length
ℓ from Z,
∆ = 2ǫ+
1
2
√
2ℓ−Hǫmin(Z|E′), (3)
where Hǫmin(Z|E′) denotes the smooth min-entropy [37],
which quantifies the average probability that the eaves-
dropper guesses Z correctly by exploiting the optimal
strategy with access to E′. Let υ =
√
2ℓ−Hǫmin(Z|E′)/2,
the secret key of length ℓ is
ℓ =
⌊
Hǫmin(Z|E′)− 2 log2
1
2υ
⌋
. (4)
The amount of bit information leakEC + log2(2/εcor)
will be revealed to the adversary during the error-
correction step. By using a chain-rule inequality for
smooth entropies, we have Hǫmin(Z|E′) ≥ Hǫmin(Z|E) −
leakEC−log2(2/εcor), whereE is the information of eaves-
dropper before the classical post-processing.
In order to bound the smooth min-entropy Hǫmin(Z|E)
by using the uncertainty relation for smooth en-
tropies [32], we consider a gedankenexperiment that Alice
and Bob prepare the cat states instead of coherent states
when they choose the Z basis. Alice and Bob need to use
the bit strings X and X′ of length n to replace the raw
key bit strings Z and Z′ in this hypothetical protocol,
respectively. The smooth min-entropy can be given by
Hǫmin(Z|E) ≥ n−Hǫmax(X|X′)
= n[1− h(φZ)],
(5)
where the first inequality exploits the entropic un-
certainty relation [32]. The smooth max-entropy
Hǫmax(X|X′) quantifies the required number of bits that
Bob uses bit string X′ to reconstruct X, which leads to
the second inequality [29]. φZ is the phase error rate of
bit strings Z and Z′, i.e., the bit error rate of bit stringsX
andX′. In reality, φZ cannot be directly observed, which
has to be estimated by using random-sampling (without
replacement) theory.
Tight tail inequality. Here, we introduce three Lem-
mas to deal with the statistical fluctuation in the finite-
key regime. Specifically, Lemma 1 is tailored for random
sampling without replacement. Lemma 2 is the multi-
plicative Chernoff bound, which is used to bound the
observed value, given the expected value. Lemma 3 is
a variant of the multiplicative Chernoff bound, which is
tailored to estimate the expected value, given the ob-
served value. The rigorously proved tail inequalities in
each lemma are the tightest due to avoiding excessive in-
equality scaling. See Supplementary Notes 1, 2 and 3 for
details.
Lemma 1: Let Xn+k := {x1, x2, · · · , xn+k} be a string
of binary bits with n+k size, in which the number of bit
value 1 is unknown. Let Xk be a random sample (without
replacement) bit string with k size from Xn+k. Let λk
be the probability of observed bit value 1 in Xk. Let
Xn be the remaining bit string, where the probability
of observed bit value 1 in Xn is λn. Then, let Cji =
i!/[j!(i − j)!] be the binomial coefficient. For any ǫ > 0,
we have the upper tail
Pr[λn ≥ λk + γ(n, k, λk, ǫ)] ≤ ǫ, (6)
where γ(a, b, c, d) is the positive root of the equation
lnCbcb +lnC
ac+aγ(a,b,c,d)
a −lnC(a+b)c+aγ(a,b,c,d)a+b −ln d = 0.
For any ǫˆ > 0, we have the lower tail
Pr[λn ≤ λk − γˆ(n, k, λk, ǫˆ)] ≤ ǫˆ, (7)
where γˆ(a, b, c, d) is the positive root of the equation
lnCbcb +lnC
ac−aγˆ(a,b,c,d)
a −lnC(a+b)c−aγˆ(a,b,c,d)a+b −ln d = 0.
If one does not find the positive root γˆ(a, b, c, d), we let
λn = 0.
Lemma 2: Let X1, X2..., XN be a set of independent
Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) =
pi (not necessarily equal), and let X :=
∑N
i=1Xi. The
expected value of X is denoted as µx := E[X ] =
∑N
i=1 pi.
Then, let g(x, y) =
[
ey/(1 + y)1+y
]x
, for any δ > 0, we
have the upper tail
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µx] < g(µx, δ) = ǫ, (8)
where δ is the positive root of the equation µx[δ − (1 +
δ) ln(1 + δ)] − ln ǫ = 0. For any 0 < δˆ ≤ 1, we have the
lower tail
Pr[X ≤ (1 − δˆ)µx] < g(µx,−δˆ) = ǫˆ, (9)
where δˆ is the positive root of the equation µx[δˆ + (1 −
δˆ) ln(1− δˆ)] + ln ǫˆ = 0.
7Lemma 3: Let X1, X2..., XN be a set of independent
Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) =
pi (not necessarily equal), and let X :=
∑N
i=1Xi. The
expected value of X is denoted as µx := E[X ] =
∑N
i=1 pi.
An observed outcome of X is represented as x for a given
trial. For any ǫ > 0, we have µx that satisfies
µx ≥ µx = max{0, x−∆(x, ǫ)}, (10)
with failure probability ǫ, where µx is the lower bound
of µx and ∆(z, y) is the positive root of the equation
∆(z, y) − [z + ∆(z, y)] ln[1 + ∆(z, y)/z] − ln y = 0. For
any ǫˆ > 0, we have that µx satisfies
µx ≤ µx = x+ ∆ˆ(x, ǫˆ), (11)
with failure probability ǫˆ, where µx is the upper bound
of µx and ∆ˆ(z, y) is the positive root of the equation
∆ˆ(z, y) + z ln{z/[z + ∆ˆ(z, y)]}+ ln y = 0.
Statistical fluctuation of Protocol 1. In order to
bound the phase error rate φZ, we consider the gedanken-
experiment picture. There are n + k bits corresponding
to X basis. The observed error rate of k bits random
sampled from n+ k bits is EX =
1
k
∑k
j=1 rx ⊕ r′x, where
rx and r
′
x are Alice’s and Bob’s bits in set X . By using
the upper tail inequality for random sampling without
replacement in Lemma 1, the remaining error rate of n
bits, i.e., the phase error rate, can be given by
φZ ≤ EX + γ(n, k, EX, ǫ1), (12)
with failure probability ǫ1.
Finally, by composing the failure probability due to
parameter estimation, we have a total secrecy of εsec =
2ǫ+ υ + ǫ1, where we take ǫ = υ = ǫ1 = εsec/4.
Statistical fluctuation of Protocol 2. Since the cat
states are replaced by PRCS for the X basis choice in
Protocol 2, the bit error rate EX in the X basis cannot
be directly observed. In order to bound the phase error
rate φZ, we need to use the following three steps.
First, let Q∗a,b be the expected gain when Alice and
Bob send PRCS with intensities a and b, respectively,
a, b ∈ {ν, ω, 0}. Therefore, we have the relations k∗a,b =
Np2XpapbQ
∗
a,b, where k
∗
a,b are the expected values corre-
sponding to the observed values ka,b. In reality, we only
know the observed values ka,b. By using a variant of the
multiplicative Chernoff bound in Lemma 3, we can use
the observed value for a given trial to estimate the upper
(lower) bound of the expected value with a small fail-
ure probability ǫ3. The PRCS can be seen as the mixed
Fock states from the eavesdropper’s view. Let Y ∗n,m be
the expected yield when Alice sends n-photon and Bob
sends m-photon. Thereby, the expected values Y ∗n,m can
be estimated by using the decoy-state method with the
three-intensity PRCS [25, 28, 40]. Once obtaining the
upper bound of the expected yield Y
∗
n,m, one can cal-
culate the upper bound of the observed yield Y n,m by
using the lower tail of the multiplicative Chernoff bound
in Lemma 2. See Supplementary Note 4 for details. Note
that for the case of n+m ≥ 5, we let the observed yield
Y n,m = 1.
Second, we consider the gedankenexperiment picture,
in which Alice and Bob still send the cat states |ξ±(α)〉
instead of PRCS when they choose the X basis in Pro-
tocol 2. Let QZ (QX) be the observed gain when Alice
and Bob both prepare coherent states |±α〉 (cat states
|ξ±(α)〉) for a given trial. By using the tail inequality for
random sampling without replacement in Lemma 1, the
observed value QX can be bounded by
QX ≥ QX = QZ − γˆ(NX, NZ, QZ, ǫ1), (13)
with failure probability ǫ1, where we have the relations
n = NZQZ, NZ = Np
2
Z and NX = Np
2
X. Thereby, the
lower bound of the observed value is k = NXQX.
Third, the upper bound of the observed value of the
bit error rate EX can be estimated by [28]
EX ≤ QEX/QX, (14)
where we have the error gain [24, 25, 28]
Q
E
X ≤
( ∞∑
n,m=0
√
Pµ2nP
µ
2mY 2n,2m
)2
+
( ∞∑
n,m=0
√
Pµ2n+1P
µ
2m+1Y 2n+1,2m+1
)2
,
(15)
with Pµn = e
−µµn/n!. By using the upper tail inequality
for random sampling without replacement in Lemma 1,
the phase error rate can be given by
φZ ≤ EX + γ(n, k, EX, ǫ1)}, (16)
with failure probability ǫ1. We remark that the joint
constraint method [41] will further bound phase error
rate in the finite-key regime.
Finally, by composing the failure probability due to
parameter estimation, we have a total secrecy of εsec =
2ǫ + υ + 2ǫ1 + 9ǫ2 + 17ǫ3, where we take ǫ = υ = ǫ1 =
ǫ2 = ǫ3 = εsec/31.
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9SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 1: RANDOM SAMPLING WITHOUT REPLACEMENT.
Here, we present the proof for the lemma of random sampling without replacement in the Methods of the main
text. The new tail inequality of random sampling without replacement is the tightest due to avoiding any inequality
scaling.
Lemma 1. Tight tail inequality of random sampling without replacement.
Let Xn+k := {x1, x2, · · · , xn+k} be a string of binary bits with n + k size, in which the number of bit value 1
is unknown. Let Xk be a random sample (without replacement) bit string with k size from Xn+k. Let λk be the
probability of bit value 1 observed in Xk. Let Xn be the remaining bit string, where the probability of bit value 1
observed in Xn is λn. Then let Cji = i!/[j!(i− j)!] be the binomial coefficient. For any ǫ > 0, we have the upper tail
Pr[λn ≥ λk + γ(n, k, λk, ǫ)] ≤ ǫ, (17)
where γ(a, b, c, d) is the positive root of the following equation
lnCbcb + lnC
ac+aγ(a,b,c,d)
a − lnC(a+b)c+aγ(a,b,c,d)a+b − ln d = 0. (18)
For any ǫˆ > 0, we have the lower tail
Pr[λn ≤ λk − γˆ(n, k, λk, ǫˆ)] ≤ ǫˆ, (19)
where γˆ(a, b, c, d) is the positive root of the following equation
lnCbcb + lnC
ac−aγˆ(a,b,c,d)
a − lnC(a+b)c−aγˆ(a,b,c,d)a+b − ln d = 0. (20)
If one does not find the positive root γˆ(a, b, c, d), we let λn = 0.
Proof.
First, we prove the inequality of the upper tail. Let X = nλn + kλk, we have
Pr[λn ≥ λk + γ] = Pr[X ≥ (n+ k)λk + nγ, kλk]
=
n+kλk∑
X=(n+k)λk+nγ
Pr[X, kλk]
=
n+kλk∑
X=(n+k)λk+nγ
Pr[kλk|X ]Pr[X ]
=
n+kλk∑
X=(n+k)λk+nγ
Ckλkk C
X−kλk
n
CXn+k
Pr[X ]
≤ C
kλk
k C
nλk+nγ
n
C
(n+k)λk+nγ
n+k
,
(21)
where we use the fact that the conditional probability Pr[kλk|X ] = Ckλkk CX−kλkn /CXn+k is the hypergeometric dis-
tribution function and is a monotonic decreasing function of X when X ≥ (n + k)λk. By using Eq. (18), we find
Ckλkk C
nλk+nγ(n,k,λk,ǫ)
n
C
(n+k)λk+nγ(n,k,λk,ǫ)
n+k
= ǫ. (22)
Thereby, we have proved the upper tail Pr[λn ≥ λk + γ(n, k, λk, ǫ)] ≤ ǫ.
Now, we prove the inequality of the lower tail. We consider the case of λk ≥ γˆ(n, k, λk, ǫˆ) ≥ 0. Let Xˆ = nλn+ kλk,
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we have
Pr[λn ≤ λk − γˆ] = Pr[Xˆ ≤ (n+ k)λk − nγˆ, kλk]
=
(n+k)λk−nγˆ∑
Xˆ=kλk
Pr[Xˆ, kλk]
=
(n+k)λk−nγˆ∑
Xˆ=kλk
Pr[kλk|Xˆ]Pr[Xˆ ]
=
(n+k)λk−nγˆ∑
Xˆ=kλk
Ckλkk C
Xˆ−kλk
n
CXˆn+k
Pr[Xˆ]
≤ C
kλk
k C
nλk−nγˆ
n
C
(n+k)λk−nγˆ
n+k
,
(23)
where we use the fact that the conditional probability Pr[kλk|Xˆ] = Ckλkk CXˆ−kλkn /CXˆn+k is the hypergeometric dis-
tribution function and is a monotonic increasing function of Xˆ when Xˆ ≤ (n + k)λk. By using Eq. (20), we find
Ckλkk C
nλk−nγˆ(n,k,λk,ǫˆ)
n
C
(n+k)λk−nγˆ(n,k,λk,ǫˆ)
n+k
= ǫˆ. (24)
Thereby, we have proved the lower tail Pr[λn ≤ λk − γˆ(n, k, λk, ǫˆ)] ≤ ǫˆ.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 2: THE MULTIPLICATIVE CHERNOFF BOUND AND ITS VARIANT.
Here, we give the proof for the Lemma of the multiplicative Chernoff bound and its variant shown in the Methods
of the main text. First, we prove that the multiplicative Chernoff bound is almost the tightest. The multiplicative
Chernoff bound is exploited to estimate the observed value, given the expected value. Second, we propose a variant of
the multiplicative Chernoff bound as tight as possible which is used to bound the expected value, given the observed
value.
Lemma 2. Tight multiplicative Chernoff bound.
Let X1, X2..., XN be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) = pi (not necessarily
equal), and let X :=
∑N
i=1Xi. The expected value of X is denoted as µx := E[X ] =
∑N
i=1 pi. Then, let g(x, y) =[
ey
(1+y)1+y
]x
, for any δ > 0, we have the upper tail
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µx] < g(µx, δ) = ǫ, (25)
where δ is the positive root of the following equation
µx[δ − (1 + δ) ln(1 + δ)]− ln ǫ = 0. (26)
For any 0 < δˆ ≤ 1, we have the lower tail
Pr[X ≤ (1 − δˆ)µx] < g(µx,−δˆ) = ǫˆ, (27)
where δˆ is the positive root of the following equation
µx[δˆ + (1− δˆ) ln(1 − δˆ)] + ln ǫˆ = 0. (28)
Proof.
First, we prove the first inequality of upper tail. For t > 0, we can have an equivalent inequality,
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µx] = Pr[etX ≥ et(1+δ)µx ]. (29)
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By exploiting the Markov inequality, the above inequality can be given by
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µx] = Pr[etX ≥ et(1+δ)µx ] ≤ E[e
tX ]
et(1+δ)µx
. (30)
Since X = ΣNi=1Xi, we have E[e
tX ] = ΠNi=1E[e
tXi ]. The independent Bernoulli random variables satisfy Pr(Xi =
1) = pi. The expected value is E[e
tXi ] = 1 + pi(e
t − 1) < epi(et−1), where we use the fact that ey > (1 + y) for y > 0.
Thereby, we have the inequality
E[etX ] =
N∏
i=1
E[etXi ] <
N∏
i=1
epi(e
t−1) = e
∑
N
i=1
pi(e
t−1) = e(e
t−1)µx . (31)
Substituting Eq. (31) back into Eq. (30), the final inequality can be bounded by
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µx] < e
(et−1)µx
et(1+δ)µx
=
[
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
]µx
, (32)
where we assume t = ln(1 + δ) to make the bound as tight as possible. By using Eq.(26), we have
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µx] <=
[
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
]µx
= g(µx, δ) = ǫ. (33)
Now, we prove the second inequality of lower tail by using the similar method. For t > 0, we have an equivalent
inequality as follows,
Pr[X ≤ (1 − δˆ)µx] = Pr[e−tX ≥ e−t(1−δˆ)µx ]. (34)
The above inequality can be bounded by the Markov inequality,
Pr[X ≤ (1− δˆ)µx] = Pr[e−tX ≥ e−t(1−δˆ)µx ] ≤ E[e
−tX ]
e−t(1−δˆ)µx
. (35)
Obviously, E[e−tX ] = ΠNi=1E[e
−tXi ] because X = ΣNi=1Xi. The expected value is E[e
−tXi ] = 1 + pi(e−t − 1) <
epi(e
−t−1) since the independent Bernoulli random variables satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) = pi, where we use the fact that
ey > (1 + y) for −1 < y < 0. Thereby, the expected value E[e−tX ] can be written as
E[e−tX ] =
N∏
i=1
E[e−tXi ] <
N∏
i=1
epi(e
−t−1) = e
∑N
i=1
pi(e
−t−1) = e(e
−t−1)µx . (36)
Substituting Eq. (36) back into Eq. (35), the final inequality can be bounded by
Pr[X ≤ (1− δˆ)µx] < e
(e−t−1)µx
e−t(1−δˆ)µx
=
[
e−δˆ
(1 − δˆ)1−δˆ
]µx
, (37)
where we assume that t = − ln(1 − δˆ) to make the bound as tight as possible. By using Eq.(28), we have
Pr[X ≤ (1 − δˆ)µx] <
[
e−δˆ
(1− δˆ)1−δˆ
]µx
= g(µx,−δˆ) = ǫˆ, (38)
Note that the above proof of the multiplicative Chernoff bound exploits the expected value µx, which means that
this bound requires the knowledge of µx.
Lemma 3. A variant of the tight multiplicative Chernoff bound.
Let X1, X2..., XN be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) = pi (not necessarily
equal), and let X :=
∑N
i=1Xi. The expected value of X is denoted as µx := E[X ] =
∑N
i=1 pi. An observed outcome
of X is represented as x for a given trial (note that, we have x ≥ 0, µx ≥ 0 and µx is unknown). For any ǫ > 0, we
have that µx satisfies
µx ≥ µx = max{0, x−∆(x, ǫ)}, (39)
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with failure probability ǫ, where µx is the lower bound of µx and ∆(z, y) is the positive root of the following equation
∆(z, y)− [z +∆(z, y)] ln z +∆(z, y)
z
− ln y = 0. (40)
For any ǫˆ > 0, we have that µx satisfies
µx ≤ µx = x+ ∆ˆ(x, ǫˆ), (41)
with failure probability ǫˆ, where µx is upper bound of µx and ∆ˆ(z, y) is the positive root of the following equation
∆ˆ(z, y) + z ln
z
z + ∆ˆ(z, y)
+ ln y = 0. (42)
Proof.
Here, we first prove the case of Eq. (39). Obviously, µx ≡ 0 if x ≤ ∆(x, ǫ), otherwise µx = x−∆(x, ǫ). We consider
the case of x > ∆(x, ǫ). We have x > µx due to ∆(x, ǫ) > 0. The root ∆(z, y) of Eq. (40) is a monotonic increasing
function of z given fixed y. The probability can be written as
Pr[X ≥ µx +∆(X, ǫ)] < Pr[X > µx +∆(µx, ǫ)], (43)
where we exploit the fact that the observed outcome x of X for a given trial satisfies x ≥ µx, µx ≥ µx and ∆(z, y) is
a monotonic increasing function of z given fixed y. By using the upper tail of the multiplicative Chernoff bound of
Lemma 2, we have
Pr[X ≥ µx +∆(µx, ǫ)] < e
∆(µx,ǫ)
[1 + ∆(µx, ǫ)/µx]
µx+∆(µx,ǫ)
. (44)
By using Eq. (40), we find that
e∆(µx,ǫ)
[1 + ∆(µx, ǫ)/µx]
µx+∆(µx,ǫ)
= ǫ. (45)
Therefore, we have the inequality
Pr[X ≥ µx +∆(X, ǫ)] < Pr[X > µx +∆(µx, ǫ)] = ǫ, (46)
which means that the probability of the observed outcome x of X for a given trial satisfying x ≥ µx +∆(x, ǫ) is less
than ǫ. Combining the results above, we show that µx ≥ µx = max{0, x − ∆(x, ǫ)} with the failure probability at
most ǫ.
Now, we prove the case of Eq. (41). Obviously, the root ∆ˆ(z, y) of Eq. (42) is also a monotonic increasing function
of z given fixed y. The probability can be written as
Pr[X ≤ µx − ∆ˆ(X, ǫˆ)] < Pr[X < µx] = Pr[X < µx + ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)− ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)], (47)
where we exploit the fact that the observed outcome x of X for a given trial satisfies ∆ˆ(x, ǫˆ) > 0 and µx ≤ µx. By
using the lower tail of the multiplicative Chernoff bound of Lemma 2, we have
Pr[X < µx + ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)− ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)] < e
−∆ˆ(µx,ǫˆ){
1− ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)/[µx + ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)]
}µx . (48)
By exploiting Eq. (42), we can find
e−∆ˆ(µx,ǫˆ){
1− ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)/
[
µx + ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)
]}µx = ǫˆ. (49)
Therefore, we have the inequality
Pr[X ≤ µx − ∆ˆ(X, ǫˆ)] < Pr[X < µx + ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)− ∆ˆ(µx, ǫˆ)] = ǫˆ, (50)
which means that the probability of the observed outcome x of X for a given trial satisfying x ≤ µx − ∆ˆ(x, ǫˆ) is less
than ǫˆ. Combining the results above, we show that µx ≤ µx = x+ ∆ˆ(x, ǫˆ) with the failure probability at most ǫˆ.
Note that the above proof of the variant of the tight multiplicative Chernoff bound does not exploit the expected
value µx, which means that this bound does not require the knowledge of µx.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 3: COMPARING WITH PREVIOUS METHODS OF STATISTICAL
FLUCTUATION.
In this section, we will compare the statistical fluctuation analysis methods proposed in Notes 1 and 2 with previous
works. First, we consider the statistical fluctuation of expected value, given the observed value. Here, we will introduce
the rigorous variant of the Chernoff bound method proposed in [1] and the not-sufficiently-rigorous Gaussian analysis
with the central limit theorem.
Lemma 4. A variant of the multiplicative Chernoff bound in [1].
LetX1, X2, . . . , XN , be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) = pi (not necessarily
equal), and let X =
∑N
i=1Xi and µx = E[X ] =
∑N
i=1 pi, where E[·] denotes the mean value. Let x be the observed
outcome of X for a given trial (i.e., x ∈ N+) and µL = x −
√
N/2 ln (1/ǫ) for certain ǫ > 0. Then, we have that x
satisfies
x = µx + δ, (51)
except for error probability γ, where the parameter δ ∈ [−∆, ∆ˆ]. Let test1, test2 and test3 denote, respectively, the
following three conditions: µL ≥ 329 ln(2ε−1), µL > 3 ln(εˆ−1) and µL >
(
2
2e−1
)2
ln(εˆ−1) for certain ε, εˆ > 0, and let
g(x, y) =
√
2x ln (y−1). Now:
1. When test1 and test2 are fulfilled, we have that γ = ǫ+ ε+ εˆ, ∆ = g(x, ε
4/16) and ∆ˆ = g(x, εˆ3/2).
2. When test1 and test3 are fulfilled (and test2 is not fulfilled), we have that γ = ǫ + ε + εˆ, ∆ = g(x, ε
4/16) and
∆ˆ = g(x, εˆ2).
3. When test1 is fulfilled and test3 is not fulfilled, we have that γ = ǫ + ε + εˆ, ∆ = g(x, ε
4/16) and ∆ˆ =√
(N/2) ln (1/ε).
4. When test1 is not fulfilled and test2 is fulfilled, we have that γ = ǫ + ε + εˆ, ∆ =
√
(N/2) ln (1/ε) and ∆ˆ =
g(x, εˆ3/2).
5. When test1 and test2 are not fulfilled, and test3 is fulfilled, we have that γ = ǫ + ε + εˆ, ∆ =
√
(N/2) ln (1/ε)
and ∆ˆ = g(x, εˆ2).
6. When test1, test2 and test3 are not fulfilled, we have that γ = ε+ εˆ, ∆ = ∆ˆ =
√
(N/2) ln (1/ε).
Lemma 5. Gaussian analysis with the central limit theorem.
Let X1, X2, . . . , XN be a set of independent and identically distributed Bernoulli random variables that satisfy
Pr(Xi = 1) = p, and let X :=
∑N
i=1Xi. The expected value and variance of X are denoted as µx := E[X ] and
σ2 := V ar[X ]. An observed outcome of X is represented as x. When N → ∞, x−µxσ approaches a standard normal
distribution N(0, 1). Thus, as N →∞, σ = √x, for any fixed β > 0 we have
Pr[x > µx + β
√
x]→ 1√
2π
∫ ∞
β
e−
t2
2 dt =
1
2
erfc(β/
√
2),
Pr[x < µx − β
√
x]→ 1√
2π
∫ −β
−∞
e−
t2
2 dt =
1
2
erfc(β/
√
2),
(52)
where erfc(x) = 1− 2√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt is the complementary error function.
The Gaussian analysis requires infinite number of independent and identically distributed Bernoulli random vari-
ables. Therefore, any rigorous method with finite number of independent (not necessarily identically distributed)
Bernoulli random variables should not be better than Gaussian analysis. Without loss of generality, we set each
failure probability ǫ = ǫˆ = ε = εˆ = 10−10. Thereby, the three conditions of Lemma 4 [1] become: test1, µL ≥ 84.33;
test2, µL > 69.08; test3, µL > 4.68. Note that we should have the lower bound µx = x −∆ ≥ µL in Lemma 4. The
three conditions of Lemma 4 further become: test1, x ≥ 203; test2, x ≥ 181; test3, x ≥ 102. For the quantum key
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FIG. 4. Expected value as function of the observed value. The colour solid lines represent the upper bound of the expected
value, given the failure probability ǫ = 10−10. The colour dotted lines represent the lower bound of the expected value, given
the failure probability ǫ = 10−10. The black solid line represents the observed value. The results of our improved method are
always inferior but comparable to the Gaussian analysis.
FIG. 5. The difference between the expected and observed values as function of the observed value. a, The difference between
the upper bound of the expected value and observed value. b, The difference between the observed value and the lower
bound of the expected value. The failure probability ǫ = 10−10. The results of our improved method are always inferior but
comparable to the Gaussian analysis, which means that our rigorous method closes the gap between the rigorous large deviation
method in Ref. [1] and the not-sufficiently-rigorous Gaussian analysis.
distribution system, the probability Pr(Xi = 1) = pi is usually very small, which means x ≪
√
(N/2) ln (1/ǫ) and
∆ = ∆ˆ =
√
(N/2) ln (1/ǫ) do not apply. Therefore, we can restate Lemma 4 as: if x ≥ 203, the lower bound of
the expected value µx = x −
√
2x ln(ǫ−3/2) and the upper bound of the expected value µx = x +
√
2x ln(16ǫ−4); if
181 ≤ x < 203, the lower bound of the expected value µx = x−
√
2x ln(ǫ−3/2) and the upper bound of the expected
value µx = x +
√
2× 203 ln(16ǫ−4); if 102 ≤ x < 181, the lower bound of the expected value µx = x −
√
2x ln(ǫ−2)
and the upper bound of the expected value µx = x+
√
2× 203 ln(16ǫ−4); if x < 102, the lower bound of the expected
value µx = 0 and the upper bound of the expected value µx = x +
√
2× 203 ln(16ǫ−4). Note that ǫ = 10−10 and we
exploit the fact that ∆ is the monotonic increasing function of x given fixed failure probability ǫ.
Figures 4 and 5 compare the results among our improved method, the large deviation method in Ref. [1], and the
Gaussian analysis. The lower bound of the expected value in Gaussian analysis is always µx = 0, given the observed
value x ≤ 41. The upper bound of the expected value in Gaussian analysis is µx = 0, given the observed value x = 0.
The lower bound of the expected value in our improved method is always µx = 0, given the observed value x ≤ 59.
The upper bound of the expected value in our improved method is µx = ln ǫ
−1 = 23.0259, given the observed value
x = 0. The lower bound of the expected value in the large deviation method in Ref. [1] is always µx = 0, given
the observed value x ≤ 101. The upper bound of the expected value in the large deviation method in Ref. [1] is
15
FIG. 6. Comparing the methods of random sampling without replacement. a, The upper bound probability of bit value 1
observed in remaining bit string, given n = 106, λk = 0.15 and ǫ = 10
−10. b, The upper and lower bound probabilities of bit
value 1 observed in remaining bit string in our improved method, given n = 106, λk = 0.15 and ǫ = 10
−10.
µx =
√
406 ln(16ǫ−4) = 196.264, given the observed value x = 0. The results of our improved method are always
inferior but comparable to the Gaussian analysis, which means that our rigorous method closes the gap between the
rigorous large deviation method in Ref. [1] and the not-sufficiently-rigorous Gaussian analysis.
Second, we consider the statistical fluctuation of random sampling without replacement. The problem of random
sampling without replacement is usually solved by the Serfling inequality [2]. However, the Serfling inequality cannot
give very good bound here since this result does not consider the properties of the priori distribution. By using the
hypergeometric function distribution, one can provide a good bound even in a high-loss regime [3, 4].
Lemma 6. The upper bound tail inequality of random sampling without replacement [3, 4].
Let Xn+k := {x1, x2, · · · , xn+k} be a string of binary bits with n + k size, in which the number of bit value 1
is unknown. Let Xk be a random sample (without replacement) bit string with k size from Xn+k. Let λk be the
probability of bit value 1 observed in Xk. Let Xn be the remaining bit string, where the probability of bit value 1
observed in Xn is λn. For any ǫ > 0, we have the upper tail
Pr[λn ≥ λk + γ(n, k, λk, ǫ)] ≤ ǫ, (53)
where γ(a, b, c, d) is the positive root of the following equation [3]
h
[
c+
a
a+ b
γ(a, b, c, d)
]
− b
a+ b
h[c]− a
a+ b
h[c+ γ(a, b, c, d)]− 1
2(a+ b)
log2
a+ b
abc(1− c)d2 = 0, (54)
where h[x] = −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the Shannon entropy function. By exploiting the Taylor expansion, the
above result can be written as an approximate analytical formula [4],
γ(a, b, c, d)] =
√
(a+ b)c(1− c)
ab ln 2
log2
a+ b
abc(1− c)d2 . (55)
Note that the approximate analytical formula is only true for appropriate parameters a and b, which means that the
result of approximate analytical formula Eq. (55) is larger than Eq. (54). The approximate analytical formula is not
true, given small a and b.
Figure 6 compares the results among our improved method, the methods in Ref. [3] and Ref. [4] for the random
sampling without replacement. The probability of bit vale 1 observed in random sample bit string is λk = 0.15. The
size of remaining bit strings is n = 106. Our bound is the tightest because we avoid excessive inequality scaling.
Furthermore, we provide the lower bound tail inequality for random sampling without replacement, which is shown
in Fig. 6b.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 4: DECOY-STATE ANALYSIS WITH THREE-INTENSITY
Here, we exploit the decoy-state method with three-intensity (0 < ω < ν) [5, 6] to estimate the upper bound of the
expected yield Y
∗
n,m. The upper bound of the expected yield Y
∗
0,0 = Q
∗
0,0. The upper bound of the expected yield
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Y
∗
1,1, Y
∗
0,2 and Y
∗
2,0 can be given by
Y
∗
1,1 =
e2ωQ
∗
ω,ω − eω(Q∗ω,0 +Q
∗
0,ω
) +Q
∗
0,0
ω2
,
Y
∗
0,2 =
ωeνQ
∗
0,ν − νeωQ∗0,ω + (ν − ω)Q
∗
0,0
νω(ν − ω)/2 ,
Y
∗
2,0 =
ωeνQ
∗
ν,0 − νeωQ∗ω,0 + (ν − ω)Q
∗
0,0
νω(ν − ω)/2 .
(56)
The upper bound of the expected yield Y
∗
0,4 and Y
∗
4,0 can be given by
Y
∗
0,4 = min

1,
ωeνQ
∗
0,ν − νeωQ∗0,ω + (ν − ω)Q
∗
0,0
νω(ν3 − ω3)/4!

 ,
Y
∗
4,0 = min

1,
ωeνQ
∗
ν,0 − νeωQ∗ω,0 + (ν − ω)Q
∗
0,0
νω(ν3 − ω3)/4!

 .
(57)
The upper bound of the expected yield Y
∗
1,3 and Y
∗
3,1 can be given by
Y
∗
1,3 = min

1,
(ωeν+ωQ
∗
ω,ν + (ν − ω)eωQ
∗
ω,0 + νe
ωQ
∗
0,ω)− (ωeνQ∗0,ν + νe2ωQ
∗
ω,ω
+ (ν − ω)Q∗
0,0
)
νω2(ν2 − ω2)/3!


Y
∗
3,1 = min

1,
(ωeν+ωQ
∗
ν,ω + νe
ωQ
∗
ω,0 + (ν − ω)eωQ
∗
0,ω)− (ωeνQ∗ν,0 + νe2ωQ
∗
ω,ω
+ (ν − ω)Q∗
0,0
)
νω2(ν2 − ω2)/3!


(58)
The upper bound of the expected yield Y
∗
2,2 can be given by
Y
∗
2,2 = min
{
1,
1
ν2ω2(ν − ω)2/4[ω
2e2νQ
∗
ν,ν + ν
2e2ωQ
∗
ω,ω + ω(ν − ω)eν(Q
∗
ν,0 +Q
∗
0,ν) + (ν − ω)2Q
∗
0,0]
−[νωeν+ω(Q∗
ν,ω
+Q∗
ω,ν
) + ν(ν − ω)eω(Q∗
ω,0
+Q∗
0,ω
)]
}
.
(59)
Let s∗n,m = Y
∗
n,mNX
∑
a,b papbP
a
nP
b
m be upper bound of the expected bit number in the X basis given that Alice and
Bob send n-photon and m-photon. By using the upper tail of the multiplicative Chernoff bound in Lemma 2, we can
estimate the upper bound of the observed bit number sn,m given by s
∗
n,m with failure probability ǫ2. Thereby, the
upper bound of the observed yield Y n,m = sn,m/
(
NX
∑
a,b papbp
a
np
b
m
)
. For the case of n+m ≥ 5, we let the upper
bound of the observed yield Y n,m = 1.
In our simulation, we have [6]
QZ = (1 − pd)[1 − (1− 2pd)e−2µη],
EZ = [edZQ
C
Z + (1− edZ)QEZ ]/QZ,
QEZ = pd(1− pd)e−2µη,
QCZ = (1 − pd)[1 − (1− pd)e−2µη],
Qa,b = 2(1− pd)e− 12 (a+b)ηI0(
√
abη)− 2(1− pd)2e−(a+b)η.
(60)
where I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind, pd is the dark count rate, edZ is the misalignment rate
of the Z basis, η is the overall efficiency between Alice (Bob) and Charlie.
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